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INTRODUCTION 
mployment is the centerpiece of American culture. Despite the 
complaints and jokes about the workplace popularized through 
cartoons like Dilbert1 and television shows like The Office,2 the 
workplace is essential to life. Employment provides the income 
necessary to pay the bills and save for retirement. Employment 
provides status in the community. Employment is generally 
considered the overall goal of our education system. 
Approximately 59% of Americans are employed—with over 123 
million people working full time and another 26 million working part 
time.3 With so many people in the workforce, there is endless advice 
about finding the balance between work and life.4 Situations in life, 
such as personal illness, illness of a family member, or welcoming a 
 
1 E.g., Scott Adams, Carol Juggles Work Plus Family, DILBERT (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://dilbert.com/strip/2014-12-09. 
2 The Office is an adaption of a British comedy about workplace relationships and 
situations. The Office (NBC television broadcast 2005–2013). For more information, see 
http://www.nbc.com/the-office. 
3 Approximately 149 million people are currently employed. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-15-1697, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION–AUGUST 2015 tbl.A (2015). Of those, over six million work part-time for 
economic reasons and almost twenty million work part-time for noneconomic reasons. Id. 
at tbl.A-8. 
4 See generally, e.g., MATTHEW KELLY, OFF BALANCE: GETTING BEYOND THE WORK-
LIFE BALANCE MYTH TO PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL SATISFACTION (2011) (arguing 
that balance is unattainable, so employees should strive for “personal and professional 
satisfaction” instead). 
E
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new child into the family through birth or adoption invariably require 
employees to be absent from the workplace. This need for balance is 
heightened because most families cannot afford for either spouse to 
remain home to care to their family’s needs. 
Many American households require dual-income to meet their 
everyday expenses.5 Beyond just an employee’s personal illnesses, 
many Americans must also be absent from work to care for their 
families. In fact, in over 60% of all two-parent households in the U.S., 
both parents with children work outside of the home.6 Further 
complicating the issue, many households have elderly parents or 
grandparents that require care and assistance.7 Congress recognized 
these needs, and, in response, it enacted the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993.8 
In enacting FMLA, Congress also considered the needs of 
employers. Successfully functioning businesses depend upon a 
reliable workforce,9 and when employees are absent from work, their 
role is not being completed—or is being completed by another 
employee stretching to cover both roles. This stretch potentially 
results in reduced productivity. Therefore, as part of FMLA, Congress 
wanted to provide employers with flexibility in administering the 
prescribed leave.10 One area of flexibility provided is that employers 
may choose to substitute, or run concurrently, accrued paid leave 
during the employee’s FMLA entitlement.11 Most FMLA policies not 
 
5 THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 
NINE FACTS ABOUT AMERICAN FAMILIES AND WORK 4 (2014), https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nine_facts_about_family_and_work_real_final.pdf. 
6 Id. at 11; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE 
USDL-15-0689, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES–2014 2 (2015). 
7 THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 
supra note 5, at 12; see also Brigid Schulte, Aging Population Prompts More Employers to 
Offer Elder-Care Benefits to Workers, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/local/aging-population-prompts-more-employers-to-offer-elder-care 
-benefits-to-workers/2014/11/16/25f9c8e6-6847-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html. 
8 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
9 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Settles Disability Bias 
Suit for $650,000 Against United Blood (Aug. 21, 2001), 2001 WL 1851217 (announcing 
the settlement of a suit brought by the EEOC on behalf of employees who were terminated 
under an employer’s illegal medical leave policy). 
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3). 
11 Id. § 2612(d)(2)(A). “The term substitute means that the paid leave provided by the 
employer, and accrued pursuant to established policies of the employer, will run 
concurrently with the unpaid FMLA leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a) (2015). “Accrued 
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only require substitution, but also require employees to invoke FMLA 
protection anytime that a qualifying reason exists regardless of the 
employee’s accrued leave balance.12 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Escriba v. Foster Poultry 
Farms, Inc.13 has caused employers and employment attorneys to 
question whether an employee may decline FMLA protection and 
only invoke their paid leave balance.14 The fear, especially for 
employers with generous leave policies, is that employees will decline 
FMLA protection so they can invoke it at a later time.15 If an 
employee may subsequently use accrued leave and FMLA leave, the 
employee could be absent from the workplace for five or more 
months.16 
In Escriba, contrary to common practice and Department of Labor 
(DOL) guidance, the court declared that “an employee can 
 
leave means the leave earned by an employee during the current leave year that is unused 
at any given time in that year.” 5 C.F.R. § 630.201(b) (emphasis omitted). This includes 
vacation and other employer-sponsored paid leave. See Fact Sheet: Annual Leave 
(General Information), U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data   
-oversight/pay-leave/leave-administration/fact-sheets/annual-leave/ (last visited Nov. 27, 
2015). 
12 For a sample FMLA policy, see Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (Includes 
Qualifying Exigency and Military Caregiver Leave), SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., 
§ G (July 15, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages 
/fmlaleave(withservicememberleaveexpansion).aspx [hereinafter SHRM Sample Policy]. 
13 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014). 
14 E.g., Karin Jones, Ninth Circuit Approves Employees’ Right to Strategically Decline 
FMLA Leave in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, STOEL RIVES: WORLD EMP. (June 20, 
2014), http://www.stoelrivesworldofemployment.com/2014/06/articles/statutes/fmla/ninth 
-circuit-approves-employees-right-to-strategically-decline-fmla-leave-in-escriba-v-foster   
-poultry-farms/ (advising that employers must allow employees to exhaust accrued leave 
prior to requiring them to invoke FMLA); Jeff Nowak, Can an Employee Decline FMLA 
Leave Even Though the Absence is Covered by the Act?, FMLA INSIGHTS (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.fmlainsights.com/can-an-employee-decline-fmla-leave-even-though-the            
-absence-is-covered-by-the-act-court-says-yes/ (advising that employers do not need to 
update their FMLA policies after Escriba). 
15 See Margaret Kostopulos, You Want to Grant FMLA, But the Employee Won’t 
Cooperate, WORKPLACE REP. WITH ANCEL GLINK (Mar. 18, 2015), http://workplacereport 
.ancelglink.com/2015/03/you-want-to-grant-fmla-but-employee.html. 
16 For example, the State of Oregon allows its employees, depending upon 
classification, to accrue up to 350 hours (8.75 weeks) of paid vacation. CHIEF HUMAN 
RES. OFFICE, OR. DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., VACATION LEAVE POLICY NO. 
60.000.05(1)(i)(A) (2015). With an additional twelve weeks provided by FMLA, an 
employee’s absence could last approximately five months before an employee would need 
to take sick leave, which accrues at an additional eight hours per month. See HUMAN RES. 
SERVS. DIV., OR. DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., SICK LEAVE WITH PAY POLICY NO. 
60.000.01(1)(a) (2010). 
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affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave.”17 Since then, there has not 
been an authoritative interpretation of the Escriba decision, and 
subsequent judicial opinions that cite Escriba have not provided a 
meaningful clarification of the court’s position on whether an 
employer may require an employee to take FMLA leave, or whether 
the employer must allow an employee to decline FMLA.18 Further, 
employment attorneys have reached differing conclusions about 
Escriba’s implications for employers’ FMLA policies.19 
This Note explores the FMLA, DOL regulations and guidance, and 
judicial precedent that provide the backbone of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. Part I of this Note describes FMLA, including the legislative 
intent, responsibilities of both employers and employees under 
FMLA, and the statute’s coexistence with DOL regulations, state 
laws, and employer policies. Part I then outlines the claims available 
to employees under FMLA and the judicial precedent supporting the 
Ninth Circuit’s assertion that FMLA protection may be affirmatively 
declined. 
After providing a background of FMLA and its administrative and 
judicial interpretations, this Note discusses Escriba and its 
implications for employer leave policies. Part II of this Note reviews 
the background facts, policies at issue, and arguments of the parties. 
Then, Part III explains the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Escriba. And 
finally, Part IV argues that the decision in Escriba supports employer 
freedom in crafting leave policies that are best for their particular 
business. Part IV also argues that reading Escriba as a new FMLA 
right given to employees by citing a single sentence from the opinion 
is a misinterpretation of FMLA and Escriba because of 
inconsistencies with the statute, regulations, and judicial precedent. 
This Note concludes that Escriba does not require employers to 
change their FMLA policies. Instead, Escriba allows employers to 
choose whether to provide an additional benefit to their employees by 
allowing subsequent use of accrued and FMLA-protected leave. 
 
17 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1244. 
18 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
19 Compare, e.g., Jones, supra note 14, with, e.g., Nowak, supra note 14. 
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I 
BACKGROUND: THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 
On February 5, 1993, FMLA was the first bill signed into law by 
President Bill Clinton. President Clinton stated that he was proud of 
the bill and felt that it “truly put[] people first.”20 The United  States 
Congress passed FMLA to protect employees that need to be absent 
from the workplace for “particular circumstances that are critical to 
the life of a family.”21 FMLA allows employees up to twelve weeks 
of protected unpaid leave each year.22 Protected leave may be used 
for absences related to specific family and medical obligations such as 
the birth or adoption of a child, care for the employee’s own 
qualifying illness, or care for the illness of a close family member.23 
In the 1980s, Congress recognized that the rising number of 
women in the workforce significantly affected American families.24 
Without a full time caregiver in the home, balancing the stability and 
economic security of employment with the ability to fulfill personal 
responsibilities became an important national interest.25 However, 
Congress also recognized that providing employers the ability to 
maintain a stable workforce was of vital importance.26 To promote 
both objectives, Congress tasked the DOL with providing 
administrative guidelines and enforcing FMLA.27 The statute and the 
accompanying DOL guidelines set out duties for both employers and 
employees to balance the needs of family and industry. Courts also 
enforce FMLA and defer to the DOL’s reasonable interpretations of 
FMLA when adjudicating related interference and retaliation 
claims.28 
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Escriba, it is 
important to first understand the statutory background and judicial 
enforcement of FMLA. It is also important to appreciate the rights 
 
20 William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 
February 5, 1993, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON, 1993 49, 49 (1993). 
21 S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 1–2 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 4. 
22 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012). 
23 Id. 
24 139 CONG. REC. 1690 (1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). 
26 Id. § 2601(b)(3). 
27 Id. § 2654. 
28 E.g., Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1123 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001). 
THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2015  9:08 AM 
2015] The Employer’s or the Employee’s Right to Choose? The Practical Effects of 261 
Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. on Employer Family Medical Leave Policies 
in the Ninth Circuit 
and responsibilities of both employers and employees, and to be 
aware of the remedies available under FMLA. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
This Part provides a basic overview of FMLA. First, Part I.A.1 
discusses Congress’s intent when it enacted the statute. Then, Part 
I.A.2 supports the strong deference given to the DOL regulations and 
guidelines by the courts. Part I.A.3 outlines employer rights under 
FMLA and highlights the flexibility Congress gives employers in the 
administration of their policies. Next, Part I.A.4 summarizes 
employee responsibilities under FMLA, and Part I.A.5 explores the 
options available to employers and employees for accrued leave 
substitution. Finally, Part I.A.6 discusses the interaction of FMLA 
with state laws and individual employer policies. 
1. Legislative Intent 
In the 1980s, Congress recognized a need for family leave.29 
Primarily, this was based upon the high number of women entering 
the workforce30 and thus removing a full time caregiver from the 
home.31 In 1992, 48% of two-parent households with children 
 
29 See History of the FMLA: A Story of Passion, Patience and Persistence: The Nine-
Year Fight to Make FMLA the Law of the Land, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/issues/work-family/history-of-the-fmla 
.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (“In 1984 . . . we 
wrote the first draft of the legislation that would later become . . . FMLA.”). 
30 See 139 CONG. REC. 1693 (1993) (letter from DOL Secretary Robert Reich) (“Over 
the past 25 years the American family and the American workplace have undergone 
unprecedented changes, which have created a compelling need for [FMLA] . . . . 
[E]conomic necessity and changing cultural standards—as well as greater opportunity—
have resulted in large numbers of women entering the work force . . . .”). 
31 Id. at 1981. One of FMLA’s cosponsors, Colorado Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, 
responded to the apprehension of her colleagues about the bill by highlighting that families 
who required dual-income were unable to have a stay-at-home wife and mother: 
The answer is always, “If you are a care-giver, you shouldn’t be in the 
workplace. You should be able to afford somebody full time to stay home.” In 
other words, get a wife. 
 I mean I would like a wife; I think most of the Congresswomen would like a 
wife. My husband would like a wife. . . . [but we] realize that we do have to be 
both care-givers and good employees. 
Id. Congresswoman Schroeder is recognized as an important leader for women’s and 
family issues during her twenty-four years in Congress. For information on her career, see 
Jeanine Cali, Former U.S. Representative Pat Schroeder Discusses Her Tenure on the 
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reported that they would be unable to meet expenses without dual-
income, resulting in approximately two-thirds of women with 
children working full-time.32 This was a 200% increase since 1970.33 
By 1990, 60% of women with children under the age of six and 75% 
of women with children between the ages of six and seventeen 
worked outside the home.34 Further, beyond responsibilities to 
children, Congress was concerned with the obligations that working 
women had to elderly family members.35 Family obligations, 
however, did not, and do not, only affect women. Congress 
recognized that men were also affected by changing family and health 
situations that may require protected leave from work; thus, it made 
FMLA protections available to men and women equally.36 
Generally, the Senate supported FMLA; however, Republican 
opposition in the House of Representatives led to fervent debate on 
several issues.37 Foremost, representatives were concerned about 
legislating employer policies rather than allowing businesses to 
control their own employee benefit programs.38 In addition, 
 
Hill, LIBR. CONGRESS: IN CUSTODIA LEGIS (June 13, 2014), http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2014 
/06/former-u-s-representative-pat-schroeder-discusses-her-tenure-on-the-hill/. 
32 139 CONG. REC. 1693 (letter from DOL Secretary Robert Reich). 
33 Id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Gunderson). 
34 Id. at 1697 (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
35 See id. at 1690 (statement of Sen. Dodd). In the early 1990s, approximately one 
million working women with children reported that they also cared for elderly family 
members. Id. 
36 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2012) (“consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); see also 139 CONG. REC. 1693 (approximately one-fourth of 
American children were raised by a single parent in 1992). 
37 See generally 139 CONG. REC. 1958–2048. While FMLA had bipartisan support to 
pass both bodies of Congress, voting to override President Bush’s veto still generally fell 
along party lines. Donna R. Lenhoff & Lissa Bell, Government Support for Working 
Families and for Communities: Family and Medical Leave as a Case Study, NAT’L 
PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, at 9, http://www.nationalpartnership.org 
/research-library/work-family/fmla/fmla-case-study-lenhoff-bell.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 
2015). In 1993, the United States Senate was comprised of fifty-seven Democrats and 
forty-three Republicans. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). Meanwhile, the 
House of Representatives was comprised of 258 Democrats, 176 Republicans, and 1 
Independent. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789-Present, HIST., ART & 
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party        
-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
38 “Strong competitive businesses are not built on the theory that Government knows 
best.” 139 CONG. REC. 1990–91 (statement of Rep. Hoekstra). “Since when does 
Government know what is best for our Nation’s businesses? Or better yet, for our 
families? It is this kind of Government intervention that has crippled businesses and the 
American families in the first place.” Id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Dornan). 
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representatives debated the potential cost of family leave to 
businesses,39 along with the potential disruption to business 
operations if an employee was absent from work for three months.40 
Opposition also voiced fears that employees would abuse the 
entitlement.41 
Meanwhile, other representatives did not feel that the bill went far 
enough to protect American workers.42 In 1993, 127 other countries 
already offered some form of family leave.43 Many of these countries 
mandated paid leave during family absences.44 Further, 
representatives called FMLA, as written, discriminatory against 
employees who work for ineligible small businesses,45 and debated 
whether opportunities for women of childbearing age would be 
limited by FMLA because employers would be unwilling to hire these 
women into key positions.46 Lastly, some representatives expressed 
tremendous concern about employees who could not afford to take 
unpaid leave despite having a qualifying reason.47 These 
representatives argued that a more comprehensive bill would better 
effectuate FMLA’s purpose and better meet the needs of American 
workers.48 
 
39 In 1993, the average cost of family leave to a business would have been six dollars 
per employee annually. Id. at 1981 (statement of Rep. Boehlert). 
40 Id. at 1998 (statement of Rep. Fowler). 
41 E.g., id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Dornan). Republican Representative Boehlert 
avidly rebuked his colleagues who made this assertion. Id. at 1981. Democratic 
Representative Mink echoed Representative Boehlert’s outrage: “It is ridiculous to assume 
that people will abuse this law. Who in the world is going to take leave without pay for 
other than the most serious of all reasons?” Id. at 1986. 
42 See id. at 1987 (statement of Rep. Owens). Earlier drafts of the bill offered up to 
twenty-six weeks of protected leave. Id. 
43 Id. at 1692, 1987. 
44 “[O]ur chief economic competitors like Japan and Germany [provide] paid family 
leave.” Id. at 1987 (statement of Rep. Owens); see also id. at 2000 (statement of Rep. 
Manzullo) (“I received a letter this morning from the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Reich, who 
stated that the United States is the only industrialized country in the world that does not 
have mandated family leave.”). 
45 E.g., id. at 1988 (statement of Rep. Kim). 
46 E.g., id. at 1999 (statement of Rep. Dunn). 
47 E.g., id. at 1987 (statement of Rep. Owens); id. at 1988 (statement of Rep. Kim). 
48 See id. at 1987 (statement of Rep. Owens) (“[W]e must press on to assure that 
income replacement is made part of our national family and medical leave policy.”). 
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Compromise ensued and, eight years and two vetoes after the 
initial draft, President Bill Clinton signed FMLA into law.49 As part 
of the statute, Congress delegated enforcement power to the DOL.50 
2. Deference to Department of Labor Regulations 
Provided requisite tests are met, courts defer to the assigned 
agency’s interpretation of the statute,51 and every court thus far has 
deferred to the DOL’s regulations and guidelines when interpreting 
FMLA.52 There is a two-step process to determine if an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is granted deference.53 First, using the plain 
language of the statute, the court determines whether the explicit 
directive of Congress contradicts the agency’s regulations.54 If not, or 
if the statute is silent on the issue, the court must then determine if the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.55 
[When] Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate 
a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. . . . [A] court may 
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.56 
Under the Chevron test, courts give deference to DOL’s 
interpretations of FMLA.57 Congress explicitly authorized the DOL to 
promulgate regulations to effectuate the statute.58 The DOL 
regulations applicable to this analysis, regarding both notice59 and 
substitution of accrued leave,60 are either identical or coexist with 
 
49 Lenhoff & Bell, supra note 37, at 9, 20. President George H.W. Bush vetoed FMLA 
twice. 139 CONG. REC. 1690 (statement of Sen. Dodd). His second veto could have been 
overridden by the Senate, where the bill passed with seventy-five supporting votes. Id. 
However, the House of Representatives did not have the required two-thirds majority to 
override President Bush’s decision. See id. 
50 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2012). 
51 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
52 See, e.g., Bement v. Cox, No. 3:12-cv-00475-MMD-WGC, 2014 WL 4699620, at *3 
(D. Nev. Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125. 1133 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
53 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44 [hereinafter the Chevron test]. 
54 Id. at 842–43. 
55 Id. at 843–44. 
56 Id. (footnote omitted). 
57 E.g., Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
58 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2012). 
59 Compare 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302–825.303 (2015) with 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e). 
60 Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.207 with 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2). 
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their FMLA counterparts without contradiction. When interpreting the 
FMLA—including each party’s rights and responsibilities—courts 
should first look at the statute itself, the applicable regulations, and 
other DOL guidance to determine compliance.61 
3. Employer Rights and Responsibilities Under FMLA 
Employers have several responsibilities under FMLA and the 
accompanying DOL regulations. FMLA requires employers to post 
notice educating their employees about their FMLA rights.62 Once the 
employee has provided sufficient information for an employer to 
make an informed decision, DOL regulations require employers to 
recognize FMLA-qualifying absences.63 Employers must also 
properly designate qualifying absences as protected leave either prior 
to the commencement of leave or retroactively.64 However, whether 
designated before or after leave commences, the employer may only 
base its designation upon information provided by the employee.65 
The employer’s obligations are triggered by either an employee’s 
request or by otherwise learning that a FMLA-qualifying reason for 
leave exists.66 Within five business days of receiving this information, 
the employer must provide the employee with written notification of 
the designation of leave.67 The notification must include whether the 
request has been approved and the amount of leave that will be 
counted against the employee’s FMLA entitlement.68 
 
61 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
62 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a). 
63 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a). 
64 Id. §§ 825.300(d), 825.301(d). 
65 Id. § 825.301(a). If the employer would like a second opinion about an employee’s 
own illness, the employer may request another examination at their own expense. 29 
U.S.C. § 2613(c). 
66 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.301(a)–(b). 
67 Id. §§ 825.300(b)(1), 825.300(c). The written notification may be distributed 
electronically so long as it meets all the other requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(c). Id. 
§ 825.300(c)(6). However, whether the employer must do more than simply post the 
designation in the organization’s intranet system is a material question of fact for the jury. 
Alexander v. Boeing Co., No. C13-1369RAJ, 2014 WL 3734291, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 
28, 2014). 
68 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.300(d)(4), (6). A DOL approved sample form is available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/forms/WH-382.pdf. 
THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2015  9:08 AM 
266 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 255 
An employer may also retroactively designate FMLA leave.69 To 
retroactively designate leave, the employer must provide the same 
notice to the employee that would have been provided if the leave was 
designated prior to the qualifying absence.70 An employer may 
choose when to retroactively designate FMLA leave so long as a 
qualifying reason existed during the designated period of leave and 
the retroactive designation does not cause harm to the employee.71 
A viable FMLA claim may exist if an employer incorrectly 
designates leave as FMLA-qualifying.72 However, this only arises if 
the employer later denies FMLA leave for a qualifying reason 
because the entitlement has been exhausted and later disciplines the 
employee for unauthorized absences that are related to the FMLA-
qualifying reason.73 This is called involuntary leave.74 Involuntary 
leave claims are not viable if the employer based its decision on a 
FMLA-qualifying reason that existed at the time of the designation.75 
An employee’s request does not determine if the absence is 
designated as FMLA-protected, and the employee may not bar a 
legitimate designation.76 No legal harm arises from qualifying leave 
being counted against the employee’s twelve-week entitlement.77 
Employers are also given rights under FMLA. DOL allows 
employers to have broad discretion in the creation and 
implementation of their FMLA policies.78 Employers may choose to 
create policies which give their employees additional benefits or 
 
69 Id. § 825.300(d)(1). 
70 Id. § 825.301(d). 
71 Id. Harm has been interpreted as prejudice against the employee or economic harm. 
See Rincon v. AFSCME, No. C12-4158MEJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114403, at *43–44 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013). 
72 See Megan E. Blomquist, Comment, A Shield, Not a Sword: Involuntary Leave 
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH. L. REV. 509, 526–28 (2001). 
73 Walker v. Trinity Marine Prods., Inc., 721 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
74 See infra Part I.B.1. 
75 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA-68 (July 21, 
1995); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA-49 (Oct. 27, 1994). 
76 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA-83 (Aug. 7, 1996) 
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.208) [hereinafter FMLA-83]. 
77 See Rincon v. AFSCME, No. C12-4158MEJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114403, at 
*42–44 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013). 
78 “The choice of options was intended to give maximum flexibility for ease in 
administering FMLA in conjunction with other ongoing employer leave plans . . . .” 
Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting The 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2199 (Jan. 6, 1995)). 
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which only meet the statutory minimums.79 Either way, clear 
communication with employees about how FMLA is administered is 
the key to employer autonomy under FMLA.80 
4. Employee Responsibilities Under FMLA 
FMLA also places certain responsibilities upon employees who 
invoke the entitlement. An employer may require an employee to 
produce a medical certification verifying the FMLA-qualifying reason 
for leave.81 This certification must include the date on which the 
condition commenced,82 which allows employers to retroactively 
designate FMLA leave if necessary.83 The certification must also 
include the appropriate medical facts to properly designate the leave, 
as well as the expected duration and need for FMLA leave.84 The 
employer may also require a doctor’s clearance before allowing an 
employee to return to work if the absence was due to the employee’s 
own qualifying illness.85 If any accommodations are needed to keep 
the employee safe and healthy at work, the doctor should also specify 
those accommodations in a manner consistent with ADA 
requirements.86 Failure of the employee to provide a sufficient and 
timely certification allows the employer to deny FMLA leave.87 
 
79 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA2004-3-A (Oct. 
4, 2004) [hereinafter FMLA2004-3-A]. 
80 See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. at 2219 (“The purpose 
of this provision is to provide employees the opportunity to learn from their employers of 
the manner in which that employer intends to implement FMLA and what company 
policies and procedures are applicable so that employees may make FMLA plans fully 
aware of their rights and obligations.”). 
81 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (2012). 
82 Id. § 2613(b)(1). 
83 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d) (2015). 
84 29 U.S.C. §§ 2613(b)(2)-(3). 
85 Id. § 2614(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(a). 
86 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.306(d); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL 
EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) 
(2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html. The interplay between 
FMLA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, is 
mentioned and implied throughout 29 C.F.R. pt. 825. E.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.123(a), 
825.216(c), 825.218(d), 825.306(d), 825.312(h). 
87 Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008); 29 C.F.R. § 
825.306(e). 
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Without FMLA protection, the employer may take disciplinary action 
against the employee for unauthorized absences.88 
5. FMLA Accrued Leave Substitution Policies 
There are two ways that accrued paid leave may be substituted for 
unpaid FMLA leave.89 First, the employee may request to substitute 
accrued leave.90 Second, the employer’s policy may require all 
employees invoking FMLA protection to substitute available paid 
leave.91 If neither occurs, the employee retains all paid leave despite 
their FMLA-related absence.92 Generally, the employer requires 
employees to use FMLA-protected leave concurrently with accrued 
leave.93 Further, employees generally do not contest the concurrent 
use of accrued leave. Since employers are not required to pay 
employees during FMLA absences,94 most employees may not 
otherwise receive income during their absence. Concurrent use of 
leave both protects employees financially and provides a safeguard to 
the employer, as Congress intended.95 
6. Interaction Between FMLA with Individual State Laws and 
Employer Policies 
Employers have responsibilities not only under FMLA, but also 
under state laws and their own individual leave policies.96 In enacting 
FMLA, Congress created a minimum standard for family and medical 
leave.97 The statute allows both states98 and employers99 to create 
 
88 Ridings, 537 F.3d at 771; 29 C.F.R. § 825.306(e). 
89 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a). 
90 The employee must meet the employer’s normal leave policies to enforce this 
request. Id.; see also id. § 825.302(d). But see Solovey v. Wyo. Valley Health Care Sys.-
Hosp., 396 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the employer’s policy 
requiring two weeks’ notice to substitute paid leave when the qualifying reason was 
unforeseeable chilled the invocation of the plaintiff’s FMLA rights). 
91 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a). This policy must be clearly communicated to employees. See 
id. § 825.300(c)(iii). 
92 Id. § 825.207(b). 
93 See, e.g., SHRM Sample Policy, supra note 12, § G. 
94 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(1) (2012). 
95 Id. § 2601(b)(1). 
96 Id. §§ 2651(b), 2652(a). 
97 See id. § 2653. 
98 “Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to 
supersede any provision of any State or local law that provides greater family or medical 
leave rights than the rights established under this Act or any amendment made by this 
Act.” Id. § 2651(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a) (2015). 
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policies that offer greater benefits to employees. Courts judge 
employers against the standard that is most beneficial to the 
employee.100 
Currently, eleven states have family and medical leave statutes, 
including four within the Ninth Circuit.101 The California Family 
Rights Act,102 Hawaii Family and Medical Leave Act,103 Oregon 
Family Leave Act,104 and the Washington State Family Leave Act105 
mirror the federal statute while expanding employee rights. However, 
the procedures relevant to notice and substituted leave do not 
substantially differ from FMLA in any state within the Ninth 
Circuit.106 
 
99 29 U.S.C. § 2652(a); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.700(a)–(b). 
  Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to 
diminish the obligation of an employer to comply with any collective bargaining 
agreement or any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater 
family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established under this 
Act or any amendment made by this Act. 
Id. 
100 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2651(b), 2652(a). 
101 California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Federal vs. State Family and Medical 
Leave Laws, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/state 
/fmla/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). The District of Columbia also has an individual family 
and medical leave law. Id. 
102 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945.2 (West 2014 & Supp. 2015). For a comparison to 
FMLA, see CAL. DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT AND 
CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT FMLA/CFRA POLICY AND PROCEDURES (2000), 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/ohr/supervisor/DGSFMLAPolicyProcedures.pdf. 
103 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 398-1 to 398-29 (2012). For a comparison to FMLA, see 
WAGE STANDARDS DIV., HAW. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, HAWAII FAMILY 
LEAVE LAW (HFLL) AND THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) COMPARISON 
CHART (2013), http://labor.hawaii.gov/wsd/files/2013/10/Family-Leave-Comparison         
-Chart-rev-10-29-2013.pdf. 
104 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.150–659A.186 (2013). For a comparison to FMLA, see 
OR. BUREAU OF LABOR & INDUS., Technical Assistance for Employers: Oregon Family 
Leave Act (OFLA), OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/boli/TA/pages/t_faq_oregon 
_family_leave_act_01-2011.aspx (last updated Aug. 2015). 
105 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.78.010–904 (2015); see also The Washington State 
Family Care Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.12.265–295 (2015). For a comparison to 
FMLA, see WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., PROTECTED LEAVE LAWS (2015), 
http://www.lni.wa.gov/WorkplaceRights/files/FamilyLeaveLawsTable.pdf. 
106 E.g., OR. BUREAU OF LABOR & INDUS., Technical Assistance for Employers: 
Family Leave, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/boli/TA/pages/t_faq_leave_laws_01 
-2011.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (“Employers can also require that employees 
exhaust all accrued paid leave before taking some or all of the family leave as unpaid 
leave, and can dictate the order in which the leave is to be used.”). 
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Employers may also choose to expand the family and medical 
leave rights of their employees. FMLA allows employers to create 
their own policies for substitution of accrued leave so long as the 
policies meet the minimum requirements of the statute.107 Throughout 
FMLA’s accompanying regulations, the DOL provides examples of 
possible enhanced rights that employers could offer.108 By allowing 
employees to retain accrued leave if substitution is neither requested 
nor required under employer policy,109 the regulations logically imply 
that employers may offer an additional benefit to their employees 
through their FMLA policies. However, employers have no legal 
obligation to provide more beneficial policies than required by 
FMLA, such as allowing employees to subsequently use accrued and 
protected leave.110 
B. Judicial Enforcement 
If the employer fails to meet their obligations under FMLA, an 
employee may bring a cause of action against the employer. Congress 
created two causes of action under FMLA. First, Congress created an 
action for interfering or denying the exercise of FMLA leave,111 and 
second, an action for retaliating against an employee for exercising 
his or her FMLA rights.112 Since then, courts have further defined 
what actions constitute a violation under this framework, including 
whether an employee may refuse FMLA protection in certain 
circumstances.113 This Part discusses the different types of FMLA 
 
107 29 U.S.C. §§ 2652(a), 2653 (2012); see also FMLA2004-3-A, supra note 79. 
108 Several subparts of 29 C.F.R. Part 825 allow employers to grant increased benefits 
to their employees through internal policies. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.210(c)(5) (2015) 
(allowing employers and employees to reach a mutual agreement on prepayment of 
insurance premiums); id. § 825.304(e) (allowing employers to grant FMLA protection 
despite the employee’s lack of proper notice). 
109 Id. § 825.207(b). 
110 Id. § 825.207(a). 
111 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 
112 “It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this 
subchapter.” Id. § 2615(a)(2). Retaliation claims will not be further addressed in this Note. 
For more information on retaliation claims, see John Bourdeau, Annotation, Establishing 
Employer’s Discriminatory Motive in Action to Recover for Employer’s Retaliation for 
Employee’s Exercise of Rights Under Family and Medical Leave Act, in Violation of § 
105(a) of Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 2615(a)), 190 A.L.R. Fed. 491 (2003) (explaining federal 
claims under FMLA); Court Expands Oregon Family Leave to Include Prohibition on 
Retaliation, OR. EMP. L. LETTER (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.hrlaws.com/node/1052057 
(explaining Oregon state claims under OFLA). 
113 E.g., Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). 
THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2015  9:08 AM 
2015] The Employer’s or the Employee’s Right to Choose? The Practical Effects of 271 
Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. on Employer Family Medical Leave Policies 
in the Ninth Circuit 
interference claims, waiver of FMLA rights, and the judicial 
precedent for refusal of FMLA protection. 
1. Judicial Rights of Action: Interference Claims 
Interference claims arise when an employer “interfere[s] with, 
restrain[s], or den[ies] the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any 
right under [FMLA].”114 An employer’s liability does not depend 
upon a subjective belief, even if held by both parties, that the leave 
was protected.115 Rather, liability is simply based upon whether the 
employee can objectively prove the elements of a prima facie 
interference case.116 To meet this prima facie burden, a plaintiff must 
establish by preponderance of the evidence that “(1) he is an 
‘[e]ligible employee,’”117 “(2) the defendant is an [e]mployer,”118 
“(3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA,”119 “(4) the 
employee gave the employer notice of his intention to take leave,”120 
“and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which 
he was entitled.”121 The most common element at issue is the fifth: 
whether the employee was denied entitled leave.122 
Interfering with or restraining the free exercise of FMLA rights 
includes using FMLA leave as a “negative factor” when making 
employment decisions.123 If the employee can show that the use of 
FMLA leave was the basis, even in part, of an adverse employment 
 
114 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a). 
115 Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001). 
116 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014); Wysong 
v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2007). 
117 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447 (alteration in original). Subject to exclusions and specific 
industry qualifications, an “eligible employee” is a person who was employed at least 
twelve months before requesting leave and fulfilled at least 1250 hours of service to the 
employer in the previous twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). 
118 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447 (alteration in original). A covered “employer” is any 
public agency, or “any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting 
commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or 
more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding year.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). 
119 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447. For an explanation of who is entitled to leave, see 29 
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
120 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447. When the need for leave is foreseeable, an employee must 
provide at least thirty days’ notice to the employer of the intention to invoke FMLA leave. 
29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1). 
121 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447. 
122 E.g., id. 
123 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2015). 
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action, courts will find the employer denied the employee’s FMLA 
rights.124 This denial provides grounds for an interference claim.125 
Even the perception that negative consequences follow the invocation 
of protected rights is actionable as interference because it could have 
a “chilling effect” on employees’ future exercise of their FMLA 
rights.126 Thus, using FMLA as a negative factor is strictly 
prohibited.127 
Employers may also be held liable for FMLA interference under an 
involuntary leave claim.128 Involuntary leave claims arise when the 
employer forces the employee to take FMLA leave despite no 
“serious health condition” which would prevent the employee from 
working.129 However, the employee simply being involuntarily 
placed on FMLA-leave without a qualifying reason is not enough to 
give rise to a viable claim.130 A viable involuntary leave claim does 
not arise until the employer later denies qualified-FMLA leave due to 
unavailability of the employee’s entitlement for that year.131 
It is important to note that an employer may designate leave as 
FMLA-protected without the employee’s intention to invoke 
FMLA.132 So long as the employer has a legitimate and documented 
reason for the designation, the employee cannot bar the use of the 
employee’s FMLA entitlement.133 In Harvender v. Norton Co., a 
New York district court stated that: 
 The plaintiff’s argument that she did not request to be placed on 
FMLA leave [was] irrelevant. Nowhere in the Act does it provide 
that FMLA leave must be granted only when the employee wishes it 
 
124 E.g., Wysong, 503 F.3d at 447. 
125 Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
126 The Ninth Circuit imported the “chilling effect” principle from previous 
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169, to better 
understand interference and restraint of employee rights. Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See generally Blomquist, supra note 72. 
129 Wysong, 503 F.3d at 449. 
130 Id. 
131 Huffman v. Speedway LLC, Nos. 14-1668, 14-2468, 2015 WL 3973325, at *4 (6th 
Cir. July 1, 2015) (“In this case, Huffman never requested FMLA leave and so her 
involuntary-leave claim remains unripe.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 13, 2015) 
(No. 15-634); Wysong, 503 F.3d at 449. 
132 Harvender v. Norton Co., No. 96-CV-653 (LEK/RWS), 1997 WL 793085, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997). 
133 FMLA-83, supra note 76. 
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to be granted. On the contrary, the FMLA only provides that leave 
must be given when certain conditions are present.134 
In Harvender, a laboratory technician provided a doctor’s note 
recommending that she avoid using certain chemicals during her 
pregnancy.135 The company did not have alternative employment or 
light duty available at that time, so the company placed her on FMLA 
leave.136 The court upheld the designation,137 finding that the 
employer was given information that the employee could no longer 
perform an essential function of the position—dealing with 
chemicals—due to a health condition.138 This is a FMLA-qualifying 
reason for leave.139 Therefore, the employee’s intent to preserve 
FMLA until a later date did not bar the employer’s designation.140 
The title of this type of interference claim as “involuntary” can 
easily create a misperception about the nature of this claim. 
Involuntary in this sense does not simply mean against the 
employee’s will.141 Involuntary claims are not based on the 
employee’s intentions.142 Rather, these claims protect employees who 
are harmed by a prior incorrect designation of leave after a statutorily-
recognized need later arises.143 
2. An Employee’s Ability to Waive FMLA Claims 
Under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), “[e]mployees cannot waive, nor 
may employers induce employees to waive, their prospective rights 
under FMLA.” The regulation specifies that a union, or other 
collective bargaining representative, cannot cede FMLA leave as part 
 
134 Harvender, 1997 WL 793085, at *7. 
135 Id. at *1. Ms. Harvender, the plaintiff-employee in this suit, miscarried her baby and 
brought claims against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach 
of employment contract, and violation of her FMLA rights after the employer forced her to 
take unpaid leave during her pregnancy. Id. 
136 Id. 




141 Compare Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) with 
Involuntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007) (defining 
involuntary as “done contrary to or without choice”). 
142 See Wysong, 503 F.3d at 449. 
143 See id. 
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of a labor contract negotiation.144 Further, it specifies that an 
employee’s voluntary decision to accept light duty in lieu of FMLA 
leave “does not constitute a waiver of the employee’s prospective 
[FMLA] rights.”145 
An employee, however, may waive his or her rights as part of a 
settlement involving an existing FMLA violation.146 Courts have 
identified that “prospective” is the key word for evaluating the word 
“waiver” under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d).147 For example, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld a severance agreement in which the employee waived 
all then-existing FMLA claims against the employer.148 In Paylor v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the employer allegedly did not properly 
respond to the employee’s FMLA request.149 The employee’s request 
came at the same time that the employer was preparing a negative 
performance evaluation and considering terminating the employee.150 
The employer offered a severance agreement that compensated the 
employee and provided benefits for thirteen weeks.151 In exchange, 
the employee agreed to waive all potential FMLA claims that 
occurred during her tenure.152 When the employee later joined 
coworkers in a FMLA-related lawsuit against the employer,153 the 
district court granted summary judgment against the employee based 
on the severance agreement, removing her from her coworkers’ 
suit.154 
To decide the validity of the severance agreement provision to 
waive FMLA claims, the Eleventh Circuit examined the history of 29 
C.F.R. § 825.220(d).155 Due to a circuit split between 2003 and 2007, 
the DOL added the word “prospective” to the regulation in 2009.156 
After determining that “prospective” was a key part of the analysis of 
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), the court defined what this word meant.157 
 
144 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2015). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (11th Cir. 2014). 
148 Id. at 1124. 





154 Id. at 1121. 
155 Id. at 1122–23. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 1123. 
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First, the court determined that it was too broad to define a 
prospective right as simply an unexercised right that may be used in 
the future.158 Instead, the court determined that “§ 825.220(d)’s 
prohibition of ‘prospective’ waiver means only that an employee may 
not waive FMLA rights, in advance, for violations of the statute that 
have yet to occur.”159 In this case, the alleged violation of the 
employee’s FMLA rights occurred prior to her acceptance of the 
severance agreement.160 Therefore, the court held that her claims 
were effectively barred by the contract.161 
3. An Employee’s Ability to Refuse FMLA Protection 
Employees may not only waive existing FMLA claims, but through 
their actions they may waive FMLA protection of qualifying leave 
after they have been properly notified of their FMLA rights.162 Courts 
across the country have affirmed an employer’s ability to take 
disciplinary action against a notified employee in certain 
circumstances.163 Even if the employer is aware of a FMLA-
qualifying reason for the absence, so long as it has fulfilled its 
statutory obligations it may discipline a notified employee who fails 
to provide the medical certification required by 29 C.F.R. § 
825.313.164 
In Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, an employee developed a 
serious health condition.165 Without permission, she began working 
limited hours on-site due to fatigue.166 The employer informed her of 
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1124. “An employer could not, for example, offer all new employees a one-
time cash payment in exchange for a waiver of any future FMLA claims.” Id. at 1123. 
160 Id. at 1124. 
161 Id. 
162 See, e.g., Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). 
163 E.g., Ridings, 537 F.3d at 771; Hunt v. Altec Indus., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-1626-JHH, 
2015 WL 5602437, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2015) (“[The employee] understood the 
policy and he failed to follow it. [The employee’s] failure to fulfill his obligations under 
[the employer’s] procedural requirements to apply for FMLA leave forecloses his ability 
to bring an FMLA interference claim.”); Nurse v. Windham Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., No. 
3:10-CV-00177 CSH, 2012 WL 6727620, at *11 (D. Conn. Dec. 28, 2012) (“FMLA is not 
a shield to protect employees from legitimate disciplinary action by their employers if their 
performance is lacking in some manner unrelated to their FMLA claims.”) (quoting Basso 
v. Potter, 596 F. Supp. 2d 324, 336 n.4 (D. Conn. 2009)). 
164 See Ridings, 537 F.3d at 771. 
165 Id. at 759. 
166 Id. 
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her FMLA rights and requested several times that she either work on-
site for eight hours each day or complete a request for intermittent 
FMLA leave.167 The employee did not complete the paperwork and 
continued to leave early.168 After multiple requests over several 
months, the employer began a progressive discipline process that 
resulted in her termination.169 
The employee sued,170 but the district court granted summary 
judgment for the employer on the FMLA interference claim because 
the employee did not complete the medical certification and thus 
effectively rejected FMLA leave.171 Her rejection was clear on the 
face of her complaint, with statements such as “[she] did not desire to 
take medical leave under FMLA,” and that “[she] refused to apply for 
FMLA leave.”172 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision.173 There was no question that the employer had fulfilled its 
notice obligations and had provided ample opportunity for the 
employee to provide the appropriate documentation to invoke 
FMLA.174 More significantly to analyzing Escriba, the court found 
that the employee’s intentional refusal to invoke FMLA protection 
precluded her from bringing a later FMLA interference claim.175 
II 
BACKGROUND: ESCRIBA V. FOSTER POULTRY FARMS, INC. 
The issue of whether an employee may refuse FMLA-protected 
leave reached the Ninth Circuit in 2014 in Escriba v. Foster Poultry 
Farms, Inc.176 Maria Escriba was terminated from Foster Poultry 
Farms (Foster Farms) after eighteen years of working there without 
any attendance issues for violating the “three day no-show, no-call 
 
167 Id. at 759–60. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 760. 
170 Id. at 758. 
171 See id. at 771, 775. 
172 Id. at 766 (quoting the employee’s deposition). 
173 Id. at 771. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. 
176 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014). The Eastern 
District of California granted Ms. Escriba an exception to the otherwise mandatory 
attorney fee payments because her case was a matter of public importance. Escriba v. 
Foster Poultry Farms, No. 1:09-CV-1878 LJO MJS, 2012 WL 174847, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. 
Jan. 20, 2012) (denying Foster Farms’ motion to recover costs). While the parties’ 
arguments and Ninth Circuit decision discussed whether this designation was appropriate, 
e.g., Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1247–49, it is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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rule.”177 Ms. Escriba claimed her FMLA rights were violated because 
she was terminated while absent for a FMLA-qualifying reason.178 A 
jury found otherwise and the claim was dismissed.179 
Escriba appealed on a variety of issues. The most significant were 
whether Foster Farms provided proper notice of her FMLA rights, 
whether she could legally refuse FMLA, and whether evidence of her 
prior FMLA use was properly admitted to the jury.180 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determinations on all issues 
submitted for appeal.181 
A single sentence in the Escriba opinion has created uncertainty 
about employer FMLA policies across the Ninth Circuit. The court’s 
statement, that “an employee can affirmatively decline to use FMLA 
leave,”182 echoes the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Ridings. However, 
when read in context with DOL guidelines and other judicial 
precedent, it becomes clear that the phrase should read: “an employee 
can affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave when the employer’s 
policy allows the employee to do so.” 
A. Factual Background 
Ms. Escriba was a low-wage worker at Foster Farms who spoke 
little English and had a third-grade education.183 She had previously 
invoked FMLA-protected leave fifteen times during her eighteen-year 
career with Foster Farms.184 Contrary to the written policy, Foster 
Farms allowed employees to initially decline FMLA leave, and wait 
to invoke the entitlement until after they had exhausted their accrued 
leave.185 Ms. Escriba was aware of this policy.186 
 
177 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1239; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9, Escriba, 743 F.3d 1236 
(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-01878-LJO-MJS). For further description of the “three-day, 
no-show, no-call” rule, see infra text accompanying note 196. 
178 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1239. 
179 Id. 
180 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 3–4. 
181 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1249. 
182 Id. at 1244. 
183 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 8. Escriba earned $9.71 per hour. Id. 
at 9. 
184 Second Stage Brief for Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. at 8, Escriba, 743 F.3d 1236 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-1878) [hereinafter Appellee’s Opening Brief]; see also discussion 
infra Part II.B. 
185 See Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 7. 
186 Id. at 8. 
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Ms. Escriba knew that she needed to take leave to visit her ailing 
father in October 2007.187 At that time, her daughter booked her a 
round-trip ticket to visit Guatemala from late November to late 
December 2007.188 
Days before her intended departure date, Ms. Escriba asked her 
supervisor for her two weeks of accrued vacation leave to visit her 
sick father.189 Since her direct supervisor did not speak Spanish, 
another supervisor confirmed in Ms. Escriba’s native language that 
she wanted “strictly . . . vacation time and not family leave.”190 Each 
time Ms. Escriba responded that she only wanted to request her two 
weeks of vacation.191 Her supervisors did not inform her of her 
FMLA rights at that time.192 However, her Spanish-speaking 
supervisor told her that she could request more time off to care for her 
father by contacting the Foster Farms Human Resources Department 
and providing a doctor’s note verifying her father’s health issues.193 
While in Guatemala Ms. Escriba determined that she would need to 
extend her stay for two weeks longer than she had requested from 
Foster Farms, but in line with her initial plane ticket.194 Neither she 
nor her husband, another Foster Farms employee who she spoke to 
several times on the telephone while she was visiting her father, 
notified Foster Farms of her extended absence.195 Ms. Escriba’s 
employment was terminated in December 2007 under the “three day 
no-show, no-call rule.”196 
 
187 Id. at 4. 
188 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1240. 
189 Id. This is a FMLA-qualifying reason for leave. Id. at 1240. 
190 Id. at 1240–41 (internal quotations omitted). 
191 Id. at 1240. 
192 Id. at 1241. 
193 Id. Ms. Escriba denies that this advice was ever given. Escriba v. Foster Poultry 
Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (disputed facts Nos. 21–22). The 
Ninth Circuit applied the facts found by the jury during the trial. See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 
1242–44. 
194 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1240, 1242–44. Ms. Escriba’s return plane ticket did not 
change. See id. at 1240. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. Under this rule, an employee who did not report to work for three days without 
notifying Foster Farms of an approved reason, such as a need for unforeseeable FMLA-
qualifying leave, would be automatically terminated. Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 
184, at 10. This rule was negotiated between the union and Foster Farms in the collective 
bargaining process. Id. at 9–10. 
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B. Foster Farms’ FMLA Policy 
Foster Farms gave an additional benefit to its employees through 
their FMLA substitution policy. While its policy required concurrent 
use of substituted leave if paid leave had not previously been 
exhausted, Foster Farms still allowed employees to exhaust their paid 
leave before invoking their FMLA entitlement.197 Foster Farms 
mistakenly believed that it could not “force” employees to take 
protected leave, so it allowed employees to expressly decline FMLA 
before they requested an additional twelve weeks of protected unpaid 
leave later.198 This provided an additional benefit to its employees, 
and employees frequently chose to take advantage of this benefit by 
initially declining FMLA in order to preserve their protected leave for 
a later date.199 
C. District Court Decision 
Ms. Escriba’s union filed a grievance on her behalf, but the Board 
of Adjustment upheld her termination under the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA).200 The union chose not to take her appeal to the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).201 Ms. Escriba individually 
challenged the union’s decision to the NLRB, but the NLRB upheld 
the union’s decision against further pursuing the grievance.202 Since 
she had exhausted her administrative remedies,203 she filed an 
interference claim under both the Family Medical Leave Act and the 
California Family Rights Act.204 
At trial, the jury found for Foster Farms.205 Escriba challenged the 
verdict.206 She claimed that as a matter of law she could not decline 
 
197 Id. at 7. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 However, FMLA, unlike many other labor issues, does not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies prior to filing a civil suit. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2012). 
204 Escriba, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. As discussed in Part I.A.6, the California Family 
Rights Act’s applicable provisions are similar to FMLA. See supra note 102. Therefore, 
the court’s analysis determines each of Ms. Escriba’s claims under FMLA. 
205 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014). Foster 
Farms cross-appealed regarding costs. Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 3. The 
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FMLA, that she had not been provided proper notice of her FMLA 
rights, and that evidence of her prior FMLA use was unduly 
prejudicial.207 The court dismissed her motion for a new trial.208 The 
court upheld its evidentiary ruling because Ms. Escriba’s prior use of 
FMLA leave was relevant to determine whether or not she intended to 
invoke FMLA in this circumstance.209 Also, the court had instructed 
the jury to only use Ms. Escriba’s prior FMLA leave to determine 
whether she intended to invoke FMLA protection.210 Since there is a 
strong presumption that the jury will “follow the instructions given to 
it,” the evidence did not unduly prejudice the jury against her.211 
D. Parties’ Arguments 
Both parties presented arguments about several issues. These issues 
included whether 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) statutorily forbade Ms. 
Escriba from declining FMLA protection,212 whether Ms. Escriba 
provided proper notice to trigger her FMLA rights,213 and whether 
evidence that Ms. Escriba had previously taken FMLA leave was 
properly admitted to the jury.214 
 
part of the Escriba opinion about costs is not relevant to this article’s analysis and 
therefore not discussed any further. 
206 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, No. 1:09-CV-1878 OWW MJS, 2011 WL 
4565857, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). 
207 Id. at *1, *4 n.4. 
208 Id. at *10. 
209 Id. at *4 n.4. 
210 See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1246. 
211 Id. at 1246. The jury was instructed “that these prior leaves are not and may not be 
presented to suggest that Ms. Escriba took too many leaves or for any other negative 
conclusion about Ms. Escriba’s leave history.” Id. at 1246. 
212 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 25–30; Appellee’s Opening Brief, 
supra note 184, at 40–48. The regulations state, in relevant part, that “[e]mployees cannot 
waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their prospective rights under 
FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representatives) cannot 
trade off the right to take FMLA leave against some other benefit offered by the 
employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2015). During the appeal, the parties presented the 
same arguments under 29 C.F.R. § 825.208, which has been removed from the updated 
version of the regulations effective in 2009. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 
25–30; Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 40–48; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 825. 
213 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 18–23; Appellee’s Opening Brief, 
supra note 184, at 31–36. 
214 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 39–42; Appellee’s Opening Brief, 
supra note 184, at 49–51. 
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1. Escriba’s Arguments 
Escriba argued that, as a matter of law, an employee cannot 
“‘refuse to exercise’ her FMLA rights” because it is waiving the 
FMLA entitlement.215 Waiver is forbidden under 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220(d), and it is the employer’s responsibility to recognize and 
designate FMLA leave.216 This was Foster Farms’ obligation and it 
did not fulfill that obligation.217 Escriba further argued that Congress 
intended to protect employees’ jobs during all qualified absences.218 
Allowing employees to refuse FMLA protection directly contradicts 
that intent.219 Instead of creating a right of refusal, Congress gave 
each party duties under FMLA.220 The employee has a duty to notify 
the employer of a FMLA-qualifying reason for leave.221 The 
employer, on the other hand, has a duty to appropriately designate the 
absence as FMLA-protected.222 Further, Escriba argued, the 
employee’s intention to invoke FMLA is not a consideration under 
the statute, the regulations, or Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.223 
Escriba next addressed the failure to provide notice claim.224 She 
reminded the court that FMLA only requires the employee to notify 
the employer of a qualifying reason for leave.225 It is the employer’s 
responsibility to recognize the reason as FMLA-qualifying,226 to 
counsel the employee on their FMLA rights and the consequences of 
not fulfilling their FMLA obligations,227 and to designate the leave as 
FMLA-protected.228 In this case, she argued, she fulfilled her 
responsibilities, but Foster Farms did not.229 In telling her supervisor 
that she needed to care for her ailing father in Guatemala, she gave 
 
215 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 177, at 25. 
216 Id. at 25–26. 
217 See id. 
218 Id. at 27, 29. 
219 Id. at 29. 
220 Id. at 28–29. 
221 See id. at 28. 
222 Id. at 28–29. 
223 Id. at 29. 
224 Id. at 18–23. 
225 Id. at 18. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 32. 
228 Id. at 18. 
229 Id. at 23. 
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her employer notice of a qualifying reason for FMLA protected 
leave.230 In response, her supervisor did not recognize that this 
invoked FMLA.231 By the supervisor’s own admission during the 
trial, he was not even aware that the leave qualified for FMLA 
protection.232 Ms. Escriba did not receive notice of her rights in either 
writing or her own language prior to this absence.233 Foster Farms 
should have recognized and designated the leave as FMLA 
protected.234 It did not.235 As a result, Foster Farms interfered with 
her FMLA rights.236 
Escriba also argued that the evidence of her prior invocation of 
FMLA was improperly admitted to the jury.237 Evidence may only be 
admitted if it is relevant to the circumstances at issue, and, she 
argued, this evidence was irrelevant.238 Ms. Escriba was not required 
to follow Foster Farms’ internal policies to trigger her FMLA rights—
so her familiarity with Foster Farms’ regular FMLA procedure did not 
bear on whether proper notice was provided.239 Therefore, she argued 
that the only effect of this evidence was to prejudice the jury against 
her.240 By introducing the jury to her prior leaves, the jury’s attention 
was focused on facts that had no bearing on the legal outcome.241 
This evidence allowed Foster Farms to “mislead” the jury.242 
2. Foster Farms’ Arguments 
Foster Farms asked the Ninth Circuit to uphold the jury’s verdict 
that Ms. Escriba could decline FMLA leave.243 First, Foster Farms 
addressed Escriba’s waiver argument.244 It argued the issue was 
precluded from review because Escriba did not raise the issue during 
 
230 Id. at 20–21. 
231 Id. at 32. 
232 Id. at 10. 
233 Id. at 33–34. 
234 Id. at 32. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 39–42. 
238 Id. at 39–41. 
239 Id. at 41–42. 
240 Id. at 42. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 43. 
243 Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 36. 
244 Id. at 37. 
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the initial trial.245 However, Foster Farms continued, if the argument 
was permitted, Ms. Escriba was allowed to—and a reasonable jury 
found that she did—decline FMLA protection.246 When 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220(d) is read alongside the rest of the section, this regulation 
does not prohibit an employee from declining FMLA.247 Rather, the 
regulation prohibits employers from using FMLA as a bargaining 
subject.248 
Foster Farms also focused its argument upon its leave policy.249 
The FMLA policy allowed employees to enjoy an additional benefit 
by using paid and unpaid leave consecutively rather than 
concurrently.250 Foster Farms maintained that neither FMLA nor the 
DOL regulations prevent an employee from refusing FMLA 
protection.251 The regulations allow an employer to place an 
employee on FMLA-protected leave without the employee’s consent; 
however, they do not require an employer to do so.252 A jury found 
that Ms. Escriba knew about her rights and intentionally took action 
to only take vacation leave.253 Foster Farms argued that the evidence 
supported the jury’s conclusion that Ms. Escriba affirmatively 
declined FMLA protection, and therefore the verdict should not be 
disturbed.254 
Next, Foster Farms responded to Escriba’s notice argument.255 Its 
response centered on the jury’s determination that Ms. Escriba did not 
provide proper notice for her FMLA needs.256 Foreseeable leave 
requires either thirty days’ notice or notice as soon as practicable.257 
Despite planning her trip to Guatemala in late October—more than 
thirty days before needing leave—Ms. Escriba did not inform her 
 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 40. 
247 See id. at 40–41. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 41. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. at 44. 
252 Id. at 43. 
253 Id. at 46–47. For example, Ms. Escriba requested leave from her direct supervisors 
rather than from Human Resources and told her supervisors twice that she did not want 
family leave. Id. 
254 Id. at 46–48. 
255 Id. at 32–36. 
256 Id. at 31–36. 
257 Id. at 32. 
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employer of her need until mid-November.258 The employer is not 
required to grant FMLA leave until thirty days after the request in a 
non-emergency situation.259 This was not an emergency situation.260 
Even if the court found that Ms. Escriba could not refuse FMLA, she 
did not fulfill her notice obligations.261 Therefore, her absences were 
still unauthorized and Foster Farms had the right to terminate her 
under the CBA.262 
Finally, Foster Farms asserted that the evidence of Ms. Escriba’s 
fifteen prior leaves was properly admitted to the jury.263 The evidence 
was relevant because it proved that she knew about FMLA leave and 
how to obtain it.264 While Ms. Escriba was not required to follow any 
specific employer procedure to initially request FMLA leave, the 
evidence showed that she intended to only take her accrued vacation 
leave.265 Further, Foster Farms argued, even if the evidence was 
improperly admitted to the jury, the limiting instruction given by the 
judge prevented any prejudice against Ms. Escriba.266 This instruction 
directed the jury to only consider the previous absences as evidence 
that Ms. Escriba intended to refuse FMLA-protected leave.267 Thus, if 
an error existed, it was harmless.268 
III 
NINTH CIRCUIT RATIONALE 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all issues 
presented for appeal.269 The court did not directly address whether 
Foster Farms had met its notice obligations. Nor was the timing of 
Ms. Escriba’s leave request discussed. Instead, the court reviewed the 
case in light of the jury’s decision,270 which found for Foster 
 
258 Id. at 32–33. 
259 Id. at 36. 
260 Id. at 35. 
261 Id. at 36. 
262 See id. 
263 Id. at 49–50. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. Foster Farms argued that Ms. Escriba was simply trying to confuse the issues. Id. 
at 50. 
266 Id. at 50–51. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1249 (9th Cir. 2014). 
270 Id. at 1242. 
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Farms.271 This Part first outlines the court’s reasoning in determining 
that an employee may decline FMLA leave. Then, it discusses why 
the court found that admission of Ms. Escriba’s previous FMLA leave 
was proper. 
A. The Right to Decline FMLA Protection 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that an 
employee may statutorily decline FMLA protection.272 Specifically, 
the court found that the evidence showed Ms. Escriba did decline 
FMLA protection.273 While the statute is silent on whether an 
employee may defer FMLA, the court determined that DOL guidance 
implies that an employee can.274 The DOL implicitly places the 
burden of consent on the employee by requiring the employee to 
provide additional information through a medical certification.275 The 
certification is essential to the FMLA designation process because it 
protects employers against involuntary leave claims.276 Further, the 
court emphasized that employers should inquire “whether FMLA 
leave is being sought by the employee” if the employee requests leave 
for a FMLA-qualifying reason.277 Therefore, the court found that 
DOL guidance and previous judicial interpretation “suggest[]” that 
employees may “affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave, even if the 
underlying reason for seeking the leave would have invoked FMLA 
protection.”278 
Next the court addressed the meaning of waiver under 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220(d).279 First, the court noted the context of the cited 
 
271 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
272 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1244 (citing Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 769 
n.3 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
273 Id. at 1244–45. 
274 Id. at 1243–44. “[N]othing in the FMLA precludes an employee from deferring the 
exercise of his or her FMLA rights and . . . the preservation of future FMLA leave is a 
compelling practical reason why an employee might wish to do so.” Id. at 1247. 
275 See id. at 1243–44. Medical certification was not directly mentioned by the court. 
Instead, the court discussed an employee’s obligation to provide more information to 
confirm that their desire is to invoke FMLA protection. Id. 
276 Id. at 1244. 
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sentence.280 This provision, in its entirety, applies primarily to 
negotiating benefits packages.281 Further, the definition of waiver 
defeats Ms. Escriba’s argument.282 Waiver, as used in the regulation, 
constitutes the permanent and “voluntary relinquishment of a known 
right,”283 and later use is not a permanent relinquishment of the 
right.284 In this case, the employer’s policy allowed Ms. Escriba to 
exhaust her paid leave before invoking her FMLA rights, and the jury 
found that Ms. Escriba refused FMLA protection so she could invoke 
the entitlement at a later date.285 Based on the jury’s findings, the 
Ninth Circuit approved of the district court’s ruling: that Ms. Escriba 
had “unequivocally refused to exercise [her FMLA] right.”286 
B. Admission of Prior Leave for Jury Consideration 
The Ninth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing evidence of Ms. Escriba’s prior FMLA use to 
be admitted to the jury.287 The court also found her evidentiary 
objection was legally unfounded, and, even if it was not, the district 
court’s jury instruction rendered the admission harmless.288 
Evidence is admissible if it tends to prove or disprove an essential 
fact.289 Foster Farms submitted this evidence to show that Ms. 
Escriba intended to preserve her leave for future use and purposefully 
requested only vacation leave.290 Ms. Escriba’s evidentiary 
contention was not legally founded since the court held that she could 
 
280 Id. 
281 Id. The prohibition on waiving FMLA rights applies to unions who collectively 
bargain for their member-employees. See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 478 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2007). 
282 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1244. 
283 Id. (quoting Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 
2009)). The Ninth Circuit adopted this definition of “waiver” from Delaware case law to 
resolve a credit card fee dispute. See Hauk, 552 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Klein v. Am. 
Luggage Works, Inc., 158 A.2d 814, 818 (Del. 1960)). 
284 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1244. 
285 Id. at 1244–45. 
286 Id. (quoting Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, No. 1:09-CV-1878 OWW MJS, 2011 
WL 4565857, at *1, *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011)). 
287 Id. at 1246–47. The jury instruction is quoted supra note 211. 
288 Id. The jury was instructed that it may not draw “negative conclusion[s]” from her 
prior invocation of FMLA. Id. at 1246. 
289 Id. at 1246 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401(b)). 
290 Id. at 1246–47. 
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refuse FMLA leave.291 Without a legal basis for the evidentiary 
challenge, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling.292 
The court further found that even if her argument was permitted, 
the error was harmless.293 An error is harmless when it does not 
unduly prejudice the opposing party.294 Since the jury is strongly 
“presumed to follow the instructions given to it,”295 the jury 
instruction—which prohibited jurors from drawing a negative 
inference based on her prior use of FMLA—properly mitigated any 
prejudice against Ms. Escriba based upon her previous leave.296 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on all 
grounds.297 Depending upon how this case is interpreted—especially 
the court’s statement that “an employee affirmatively decline to use 
FMLA leave”298—Escriba could have a lasting impact on the 
administration of FMLA policy. Throughout the Ninth Circuit, this 
case has sparked conversation on whether it is the employer’s or the 
employee’s right to choose if leave is designated as FMLA.299 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ESCRIBA DECISION 
Escriba has instigated discussion among employment attorneys 
about whether FMLA policies must be amended to allow employees 
to decline FMLA protection.300 This Part discusses the judicial 
decisions that have interpreted Escriba, although the interpretation 
 
291 Id. at 1247. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
294 The Constitution does not guarantee a perfect, error-free trial—it guarantees a fair 
one. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1983). Errors are assessed for 
harmlessness by determining whether the type of error, the impact upon the trial, and the 
strength of the opposition’s case without the error. See generally Charles S. Chapel, 
Comment, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 501 (1998) (discussing the 
evolution of harmless error review and its application in different types of cases). If the 
error prejudiced the moving party, the case should be remanded for a new trial untainted 
by the error. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). 
295 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1247 (quoting United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 923 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1249. 
298 Id. at 1244. 
299 E.g., Jones, supra note 14; Nowak, supra note 14. 
300 E.g., Jones, supra note 14; Nowak, supra note 14. 
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thus far has not been meaningful. Then, this Part proposes why it 
matters to employment attorneys and FMLA policy makers whether 
an employee declines FMLA, and, finally, this Part concludes the 
Note by discussing the practical effects of the decision on employer 
FMLA policies and arguing that no substantive change is required. 
A. Subsequent Judicial Decisions 
Since the Escriba decision, courts across the nation have cited the 
case; however most citing decisions do not reference an employee’s 
ability to decline FMLA protection.301 Instead, the cases cite Escriba 
as authority which outlines the elements of a prima facie case for 
FMLA interference,302 indicates a strong presumption that the jury 
will follow instructions,303 or retains costs to the prevailing party 
under certain circumstances.304 Thus far, however, no judicial opinion 
has discussed Escriba’s allowance of FMLA refusal in a way that 
provides meaningful guidance to employers in policy formation.305 
However, a few district court opinions have flirted with the concept. 
In Fitzgerald v. Shore Memorial Hospital, the District Court of 
New Jersey determined that whether an employee intended to refuse 
FMLA is a question of fact for the jury.306 After being approved for a 
one-year period of intermittent FMLA leave, the employee was absent 
several times without providing a doctor’s note.307 Her employer 
counseled her about her absences, and later terminated her.308 When 
she sued, she presented evidence that her absences were related to a 
heart condition.309 In defense to her FMLA interference claim, the 
employer argued that Escriba allowed the court to conclude that she 
 
301 According to a Westlaw “Citing References” report conducted on September 7, 
2015, thirty-one cases have cited Escriba. 
302 E.g., Golez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 585 F. App’x 365, 366 (9th Cir. 2014). 
303 E.g., Arnold v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-01025-AC, 2015 WL 268967, at *13 (D. 
Or. Jan. 21, 2015). 
304 E.g., Marugame v. Johnson, No. 11-00710 LEK-BMK, 2015 WL 456549, at *2 (D. 
Haw. Feb. 2, 2015). 
305 One judicial order did reject the plaintiff’s claim that he was unable to refuse FMLA 
leave and cited Escriba; however, like Foster Farms, it appears that the employer allowed 
the employee to decline his FMLA entitlement instead of mandating that the employee use 
his FMLA concurrently. Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 12-CV-2079-LRR, 2015 
WL 4742052, at *3 (N.D. Iowa, Aug. 11, 2015). 
306 Fitzgerald v. Shore Mem’l Hosp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 214, 230 (D.N.J. 2015). 
307 Id. at 223. 
308 Id. 
309 See id. at 224. 
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knew how to invoke FMLA and chose not to do so.310 However, the 
court found that summary judgment was not appropriate.311 Instead, it 
contrasted the case with Escriba, focusing on whether there was an 
express desire to refuse FMLA protection and determining that the 
jury was the appropriate fact-finder.312 The opinion does not mention 
whether or not the employer’s FMLA policy allowed employees to 
decline the protection provided by FMLA.313 
Two more cases discuss Escriba’s warning against involuntary 
leave. In Clink v. Oregon Health and Science University, the District 
Court of Oregon read Escriba as a prohibition against employers 
forcing unwilling employees to “burn up” their FMLA leave.314 
Specifically, the court warned about potential involuntary leave 
liability for the employer.315 In Clink, however, the court never 
reached either the issue of involuntary leave or the employee’s right 
to refuse FMLA protection because the employee could not establish 
a prima facie case for FMLA interference.316 Since the employee 
could no longer perform the essential functions of his position, he was 
not entitled to FMLA leave.317 
The other case that discussed refusal of FMLA protection under 
Escriba did so in dicta. The dissent in Livingood v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, a Pennsylvania worker’s 
compensation case, interpreted Escriba as “an employee benefit, not 
an employer benefit.”318 The dissent cited Escriba as legal precedent 
that the invocation of FMLA is optional and taken at the request of 
the employee only.319 Further, it emphasized that the Ninth Circuit 
stated that forcing an employee to take FMLA leave could create 
employer liability for an involuntary leave claim since an employee 
may affirmatively decline this protection.320 This dissent, like the 
 
310 Id. at 229. 
311 Id. at 230. 
312 Id. at 229–30. 
313 See id. at 221–22. 
314 Clink v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., No. 3:13-cv-01323-SI, 2014 WL 3850013, at *5 
(D. Or. Aug. 5, 2014). 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at *5–6. 
317 Id. 
318 Livingood v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, No. 1818 C.D.2013, 2014 WL 
4461048, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 11, 2014) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). 
319 Id. at *7 
320 Id. 
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discussion in Clink, fails to appreciate the elements of a FMLA 
involuntary leave claim. 
Involuntary leave is not a broad net that creates a right of action for 
any employee placed on FMLA leave who did not make a specific 
request for it.321 Involuntary leave claims require first, that no 
qualifying reason existed for the designation, and second, that the 
designation later prevented the employee from obtaining FMLA leave 
when a qualifying need arose.322 It is only when both of these 
requirements are met that the employee’s FMLA rights have been 
interfered with.323 
FMLA and its accompanying regulations allow employer 
flexibility in administering FMLA leave, including determining 
whether a qualifying reason exists for the designation.324 So long as a 
qualifying reason for the absence existed and the employer properly 
documented the reason for the absence, the employer may place the 
employee on leave regardless of the employee’s wishes and is not 
liable for an involuntary leave claim.325 Understanding what 
constitutes an involuntary leave claim is important for both employers 
and courts in a post-Escriba world. 
B. Why It Matters if Employees Decline FMLA Protection 
During the deliberations over FMLA, the U.S. House of 
Representatives debated about the meaning of FMLA to employers 
and employees.326 One aspect of the discussion focused on whether 
employees would abuse the entitlement.327 Enraged, Representative 
Mink (D-Haw.) declared, “[i]t is ridiculous to assume that people will 
abuse this law. Who in the world is going to take leave without pay 
for other than the most serious of all reasons?”328 Is this aggravating 
accusation the reason Escriba’s effect on FMLA matters to 
employment attorneys and FMLA policy makers? Put another way: is 
there a patent mistrust of employees to responsibly determine if they 
 
321 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
322 Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007). 
323 Id. 
324 See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2207 (Jan. 6, 
1995) (supplementary information to regulations). 
325 Harvender v. Norton Co., No. 96-CV-653 (LEK/RWS), 1997 WL 793085, at *8 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997). 
326 See generally 139 CONG. REC. 1958–2048 (1993). 
327 Id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Dornan). 
328 Id. at 1986. 
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want to concurrently use their FMLA leave without them being 
tempted to abuse the right? 
Yes and no. Any right may be abused, and unfortunately only 
circumstances where either the employer or the employee has 
allegedly wronged the other party are brought to the public’s 
attention. When the employer and employee work together to balance 
both parties’ needs, there is not a court case or newspaper article. 
Escriba’s effects matter because, while there can never be certainty 
regarding an employer’s workforce due to unexpected illness, 
accidents, retirement, or an employee taking an offer for another 
position, having certainty about how long the absence is expected to 
last creates more stability for the employer. This stability allows 
employers to remain flexible with other employee’s scheduling 
requests, and to plan for workflow and hiring. The other side of the 
FMLA equation—the employer’s needs—should not be ignored. 
C. Effects Upon Employer Policies 
Employers with clearly written FMLA policies do not need to 
amend their current substitution procedures in response to the Escriba 
decision. However, it is advisable that the employer’s policy 
regarding refusal of FMLA leave be explicitly stated in the policy. 
This may be as simple as the following statement: “If [employer] 
becomes aware of any qualifying reason for FMLA leave, [employer] 
will designate it as such. An employee may not refuse FMLA 
protection under [employer]’s policy.” 
There is a clear distinction between the policies of most employers 
and Foster Farms. Foster Farms’ FMLA policy, at least in practice, 
allowed employees to expressly decline FMLA leave and defer 
invocation of their FMLA entitlement until after they had exhausted 
all of their available accrued leave.329 Most employers do not allow 
this.330 Rather, if the employer is aware that a qualifying reason 
exists, it retroactively designates the leave as FMLA under 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.301(d). Foster Farms, however, did not believe that it could 
retroactively designate employee leave as FMLA.331 Instead, it 
 
329 Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 7. 
330 See e.g., SHRM Sample Policy, supra note 12, § G. 
331 Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 7. 
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consistently offered its employees the additional benefit of stacking 
accrued and FMLA leave.332 
Employers who require concurrent use of FMLA and accrued leave 
do not need to amend their FMLA policies to allow employees to 
decline FMLA. The statute and the regulations are designed to give 
employers maximum flexibility while still protecting the ability of 
employees to care for personal needs. This intention is shown through 
the options given to employers. One option is that an employer may 
create a FMLA policy that allows employees to initially refuse 
FMLA-protected leave despite a qualifying reason. Foster Farms, in 
practice, had a policy that did just that.333 Employees commonly 
refused FMLA until their accrued leave was exhausted and then 
invoked their FMLA leave at a later date.334 Foster Farms’ mistaken 
belief that it could not retroactively designate qualifying leave as 
FMLA and the resulting informal FMLA leave policy is what led to 
this litigation, and ultimately to this statement by the Ninth Circuit. 
This decision does not have sweeping implications that limit 
employers’ administration of FMLA. Instead, this decision affirmed 
the ability of employers to offer more generous leave options to its 
employees than federal law requires. 
The court’s statement in Escriba relied upon the decision in 
Ridings,335 which expanded employer flexibility in FMLA 
administration.336 Ridings affirmed that employers may discipline 
employees who are absent for qualifying reasons but have refused to 
participate in the FMLA designation process.337 Because the 
employee in Ridings never completed the paperwork to request 
FMLA—which would have identified the date the medical issue 
began and thus allowed the employer to retroactively designate her 
absences as FMLA leave—the specific FMLA policies of the 
employer were not assessed.338 
The Ninth Circuit reasoning further supports employer 
administrative flexibility. The court stated that DOL guidance 
suggests that an employee can refuse FMLA protection.339 It found 
 
332 Id. 
333 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2014). 
334 Appellee’s Opening Brief, supra note 184, at 7. 
335 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1244. 
336 See Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). 
337 Id. 
338 See id. 
339 Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1243. 
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that the regulations implicitly place a burden on the employee to 
consent to FMLA designation,340 and that previous judicial decisions 
allow an employer to inquire about the employee’s intentions to seek 
FMLA leave.341 However, none of these statements by the court 
require an employer to create a policy allowing employees to decline 
FMLA. Courts need not inquire into employee intentions,342 nor 
should they. Instead, courts should examine whether a qualifying 
reason existed, whether the proper procedures were followed, and 
whether an adverse decision was taken against the employee for 
invoking their entitlement.343 
The DOL uses the regulations to protect employees against too 
much discretion by employers in the administration of leave. 
Employers are required to notify employees of their FMLA rights,344 
and clearly communicate their leave policies.345 Further, employers 
are held to the highest standard available under FMLA, the state’s 
family and medical leave law, or their own policy.346 Employees, 
meanwhile, have a right to bring action against an employer who 
violates these rights.347 The regulations recognize that employer 
policies may change and that each employer may have a policy that is 
unique to their operation.348 An employer may not keep an employee 
“in the dark.”349 Instead, an employer must allow the employee to 
 
340 See id. 
341 Id. 
342 Harvender v. Norton Co., No. 96-CV-653 (LEK/RWS), 1997 WL 793085, at *8 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997). 
343 These are rights of action given by Congress under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2012). 
344 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2219 (Jan. 6, 1995) 
(supplementary information to regulations). 
  E]mployees [must be given] the opportunity to learn from their employers of the 
manner in which that employer intends to implement FMLA and what company 
policies and procedures are applicable so that employees may make FMLA plans 
fully aware of their rights and obligations. It was anticipated that to some large 
degree these policies would be peculiar to that employer. 
Id. 
345 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (2015). Distribution of this information may also occur 
electronically. Id. 
346 29 U.S.C. §§ 2651(b), 2652(a). 
347 See supra Part I.B.1. 
348 Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. at 2219. 
349 Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1128. 
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effectively plan for FMLA-related absences if necessary by clearly 
communicating its FMLA policy.350 
While not stated by the court, Escriba presented a factually-
specific case. FMLA allows employers to provide additional benefits 
to their employees.351 If the employer chooses to do so, FMLA 
requires the courts to hold the employer to the standard that is 
objectively better for the employee.352 Since it is objectively better 
for employees to have the option of extending their leave, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly held Foster Farms to its own FMLA policy, which 
allowed an employee to decline FMLA leave. Thus, an employee may 
affirmatively decline FMLA protection when allowed under the 
employer’s FMLA policy. 
The implication of the Escriba decision is that employers actually 
have more flexibility. Employers not only have the ability to offer 
additional leave benefits to their employees, but the court also 
reaffirmed that employers have the flexibility to pursue disciplinary 
action against employees who do not choose to actively participate in 
the designation process with the employer.353 Moving forward from 
Escriba, employers should ensure that their FMLA policies 
specifically address whether the employer will allow the employee to 
refuse FMLA leave. That policy decision, however, is wholly the 
employer’s. 
CONCLUSION 
For many Americans, everyday life depends upon managing both 
professional and familial commitments. FMLA and DOL regulations 
have helped to make the balancing of these commitments less 
onerous. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. articulated an 
employee’s ability to affirmatively refuse the protections provided by 
FMLA. While an employee may affirmatively decline FMLA, the 
employee may only do so in the narrow confines of the employer’s 
policy. Following the Escriba decision, employers should address 
whether or not employees may refuse FMLA protection in their 
written FMLA policy. However, Escriba does not require employers 
to allow employees to decline FMLA protection.   
 
350 Id. 
351 See FMLA2004-3-A, supra note 79. 
352 29 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (2012). 
353 Disciplining employees who did not properly complete the required paperwork is 
valid because the employee refused his FMLA rights. Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 
F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). 
